they are better at generating revenue from both governmental and pri vate sources. Opponents of contracting with privately owned facilities charge that private organizations are more concerned with their own financial health than with the public interest, leading them to restrict access for potential clients who cannot afford their services. In fact, both sides lack the empirical data to substantiate their contentions, particu larly when the debate concerns provider behavior in community mental health care, an area that, compared with inpatient treatment, has seen relatively few studies.
To learn more about this complex issue, we analyzed data from a na tional survey of more than 450 community mental health agencies. We developed a model for comparing management and treatment practices in public and private mental health agencies, taking into account ex ternal forces like financing and competition that might influence the behavior of agencies. We paid special attention to how ownership and competition from private practitioners affect practices related to maxi mizing private revenues, improving efficiency, and serving the commu nity. Finally, we examined the implications of these comparisons for public authorities who are considering contracting with private agencies.
Economic and Political Influences on Mental Health Agencies
Proponents and opponents of privatization speak as if the behavior of public and private organizations is fixed. Agency behavior, however, is closely tied to financial (Gronfein 1985) and political forces (Rumer 1978 ) -both of which have made their mark on mental health agencies.
Financing of nonprofit mental health agencies has changed radically since the 1950s. Originally a small group almost totally dependent on charitable donations and client fees, the ranks of mental health agencies grew rapidly after direct federal grants became available through the Community Mental Health Acts of 1963 and 1965. Private insurance then contributed a trivial proportion of total revenue in most agencies, and nonprofit providers resembled public ones: their budgets were funded directly through grants; responsibilities for the types of services they offered and the populations they served were defined broadly; and productivity demands were relatively low. Federal reasons for favoring nonprofit over public mental health centers seem to have had more to do w ith a vo id in g state legislatures and bureaucracies than w ith any p er ceived differen ces in h ow they op erated (F o ley and Sharfstein 1983) . B e cause the fed era l grants w ere g iven as " seed m o n e y ," decreasing by a specified am ou n t each year, m an y agencies began lo o k in g to private sources fo r fu n d in g , w h ich led to m ore apparent distinctions betw een n on profit and p u b lic providers.
Program con solid ation and reductions in federal fu n d in g du ring the Reagan adm inistration a d d ed m ore distance betw een pu blic and n o n profit agencies. A n u m b er o f non profits responded to the changes by in creasing th eir contracts w ith states or counties, but, instead o f awarding grants to the agencies, m any localities chose to buy treatm ent on a feefor-service basis sim ilar to the w ay private health insurers purchased care.
As states expa n ded th eir use o f fee-based M edicaid funds fo r m ental health services in the 1980s, the tie betw een agency produ ctivity and fu n din g was fu rth er strengthen ed. N o n p ro fit agencies look ed m ore and more like p ro fit-m a x im izin g firm s as they came to d epen d on clients for a significant p ro p o rtio n o f their revenues. Pu blic agencies still received most o f th eir revenues directly fro m the govern m en t rather than through clients.
Som ewhat d iffe re n t forces im p in g e d on pu blic agencies. In the late 1970s, h e igh te n ed concern over state and county spending, tax revolts, and the resulting b u d g et cuts began pressuring pu blic agencies to b e come m ore e ffic ie n t and, in som e cases, to seek alternative sources o f revenue. O v e r the next decade, pu b lic agencies, too, began to rely m ore heavily on M ed ica id and on oth er fee-based paym ents. In m any loca tions, stereotypes o f p u b lic agencies as rig id and in e ffic ien t had becom e inaccurate by the late 1980s.
A t the same tim e that econ om ic forces were pushing both pu blic and n on profit agencies to behave m ore like p ro fit-m a x im izin g firm s, p o liti cal forces w ere a p p ly in g cou n tervailin g pressure on them to be m ore responsive to p e o p le w ith severe m en tal illnesses, to m aintain a com p re hensive array o f services, and to p rovid e free or below -cost care. This pressure took the fo rm o f threats fro m the D ep artm en t o f H ealth and H um an Services, w h ich d em a n d ed repaym ent fro m agencies that had re ceived fed era l C o m m u n ity M en tal H ea lth C enter (C M H C ) grants and were ou t o f co m p lian ce w ith federa l requirem ents (U .S . D ep artm en t o f H ealth and H u m a n Services 1991). A d vo ca cy groups like the N a tio n a l A llian ce fo r the M en ta lly 111 also h eld m en tal health centers to h igh stan dards o f p u b lic service and criticized th em w hen they fa iled to m eet ex pectations (T o rre y 1988).
Changes in the p o litical and econom ic en viron m en t have b een critical in shaping the beh avior o f pu blic and n o n p ro fit agencies, bu t it is not clear w h eth er these changes have sharpened or blurred distinctions be tw een the tw o organ iza tion al form s. T o add fu rth er com plications, state policies tow ard n o n p ro fit agencies have evo lved d iffe re n tly over time.
Som e states have m ain tain ed a h ig h d egree o f control over day-to-day operations, treatin g n on profits alm ost like extensions o f governm ent.
O thers have preferred to m ain tain m ore distant relations w ith nonprofit and proprietary organizations.
Should a Community Mental Health Agency Be Run like a Business?
A great deal o f the h o p e fo r im p ro ved perform an ce through privatiza t io n -as w ell as fear fo r the p o lic y 's fa ilu re -is based on the assumption that private organ ization s operate m ore like p ro fit-m a x im izin g busi nesses than d o their pu blic counterparts. Th is prem ise is debatable in co m m u n ity m ental health because over 95 percent o f all private agencies are n o n p ro fit and th erefore are p ro h ib ited fro m distribu tin g excess rev enues to shareholders. Even i f private n on profits w ere m ore market ori en ted than pu blic agencies, how ever, opin ion s are d ivid ed about the desirability o f op eratin g a m ental health center like a business. Some p o licy makers and adm inistrators believe clients w ill ben efit from agen cies that are run m ore effic ie n tly (B rotm an 1992; Rou n dy, Kasner, and Kasner 1988; Edwards and M itch ell 1987) ; others fear clients w ill be de n ied treatm ent or w ill be served p o orly (K a n e 1989; Levin e et al. 1989;  W o y , W asserm an, and W ein er-P o m eran tz 1981); still others urge ad ministrators to fin d som e balance betw een private and pu blic orienta tions (Z elm a n et Pardes and Stockdill 1984) .
M ental health clients, advocates, and policy makers usually value ac cess to treatm ent and contin uity o f care. N o t on ly d o these factors im prove the lives o f p e o p le w ith m ental disorders, but they also represent core values that shaped the com m u n ity m ental health m ovem ent. The C o m m u n ity M en tal H ea lth Acts, w hich h elp ed in itiate about one-third o f the m ore than 2,200 com m u n ity m ental health agencies now in exis tence, sought to m ake com prehensive m ental health services available to all w h o n eeded them w ith o u t regard to their financial means (Foley and Sharfstein 1983) . In a d dition to serving those w h o could not otherwise have purchased treatm en t, co m m u n ity m ental health centers were to co ordinate and in tegrate treatm en t services fo r p e o p le w h o had previously been housed fo r lo n g periods in state m en ta l hospitals. In m any cases, this required centers to w ork closely w ith hospitals or w ith other p ro viders to ensure co n tin u ity o f care w h en patients w ere released to the com m u nity after b r ie f hospital stays (D orw a rt and H o o v er 1994) . Even th ou gh d irect fe d e ra l fu n d in g o f co m m u n ity m en ta l h ealth centers en ded in 1981, these origin a l goals have con tin u ed to be the standard against w hich all co m m u n ity m en tal health agencies, even those n ot in i tiated w ith fed era l fu nds, are m easured. O ver the years, at least three studies have con cern ed them selves w ith th e d egree to w hich m en tal health centers fu lfille d these and oth er pu blicly valu ed duties (W o y , Wasserman, and W e in er-P o m e ra n tz 1981; N aierm a n , Haskins, and R o b inson 1978; U .S . G en eral A cco u n tin g O ffic e 1979).
It is n ot clear h ow the incentives o f health care markets affect a gen cies' fu lfillm e n t o f these p u b lic expectations. Even thou gh n o n p ro fit or ganizations are subject to non distribu tion constraints, w hich reduce the possibility o f personal gain fro m excess revenues, they are still suscepti ble to a variety o f m arket influences. Salam on (19 93 ) described vulnera bility to such factors, co u p led w ith recent increases in the nu m ber o f n on p rofit and fo r-p ro fit providers o f hum an services, as " the m arketization o f w e lfa r e ." Because th eir survival is closely tied to their econom ic perform ance, private agencies m ay be m ore likely than pu blic organ iza tions to em p h asize efficien cy in operations and to m axim ize fees co l lected fr o m insurers, clien ts, and o th er p riva te sources o f revenu e.
Efficiencies lik e these m ay h elp stretch scarce pu blic dollars, but the forces that lea d to greater efficien cy m ay also weaken agencies' co m m it m ent to p u b licly valu ed goals o f ready access to n eeded care. T h e m ore strongly econ om ic incentives in the private m arket in flu en ce nonprofits (e . g . , the n eed to em p h asize b illa b le services, to m ax im ize private rev enues, to reduce adm inistrative costs, and to m on itor free care), the less co m m itted th ey m ay be to p ro v id in g treatm en t that is accessible to all or to w orkin g co llab oratively w ith oth er providers fo r the g o o d o f clients.
O n e area that is o fte n cited , but abou t w hich w e kn ow very little, is the existence, in som e agencies, o f separate facilities or services fo r pu blicly fu n d ed clients and fo r those w ith private health insurance. Separating clients on th e basis o f in com e reinforces a tw o-tier system o f care and could o u tw eig h any b en efits that m ig h t otherw ise accrue fro m contract in g w ith private agencies.
T o address these concerns, w e must kn ow m ore abou t the com parative perform an ce o f p u b lic and private agencies. For exam ple, w e need to kn ow abou t differences in efficien cy that are related to ownership. It is also im portan t to learn h ow the tw o groups respond to external pres sures, h ow these forces a ffect agencies' treatm ent o f fin ancially disadvan taged clients, and w heth er these pressures in flu en ce th eir willingness to coordin ate services w ith oth er providers. T o h e lp answer these questions, w e asked agency adm inistrators to tell us abou t th eir use o f various m an a gem en t practices, and w e co m b in ed th eir responses w ith inform ation on characteristics o f their agencies and service areas. W e w ere particularly interested in practices that m ig h t be related to efficien cy or orientation tow ard pu b lic service. W e exam in ed practices such as cu tting adm inistrative costs or using fin ancial incentives to increase em p loyee productivity that m igh t im prove efficien cy. A s indicators o f pu blic service orien tation, w e chose the am ou n t o f care given at rates b elow cost; acceptance o f referrals from pu blic hospitals, social service agencies, schools, and courts; and w ill ingness to w ork w ith other providers in serving clients. W e measured reven u e-m a xim izin g behavior by asking w hether agencies had increased their emphasis on b illa b le (to private or pu blic payers) services or on e f forts to reduce unpaid fees or missed appointm ents. U sing these prac tices could con flict w ith co m m itm en t to serve all w h o need treatment. 
Management Practices and Public Values

External Forces and Agency Characteristics
T h e history o f n o n p ro fit agencies suggests that the tendency to behave m ore like a fo r-p ro fit business is n ot solely a feature o f ow nership status.
A rgu m ents fo r p riva tiza tio n typically rely on m arket discipline im posed by co m p etitio n to achieve desirable results (D on T o assess the im portan ce o f these pu blic/private differences fo r m ental health clients, w e n eed to kn ow h o w observed differences in conduct af fect im portan t institutional outcom es such as acceptance o f p u b lic refer rals, w illin gn ess to w ork w ith oth er agencies, and provision o f subsidized care. cies in general show ed a n on significan t (p < .21) tendency to provide m ore su bsidized care than private agencies. Th is d id n ot apply, however, to p u b lic agencies fa cin g h ig h levels o f c o m p e titio n ; these actually ten d ed (a ga in , n o n sign ifica n tly) to p ro vid e less fre e care than other agencies. M ultiservice agencies, those that had been started w ith federal fu nds, and agencies located in an urban en viron m en t or that served lowin com e areas p ro v id e d sign ifican tly larger am ounts o f subsidized care (P < .02).
Methods
T h e sim p le bivariate com parison o f agency practices shown in table 2 indicates Private agencies w ere also m ore likely to charge fees fo r missed appoint m ents, to require clients to pay in advance fo r som e services, and to use a collection agency fo r past-due fees.
T h e pu blic/private differences fo u n d in the bivariate comparison re m ain ed statistically significant fo r all practices except increased emphasis can pay fu ll price; on ly then are excess revenues available to subsidize treatm ent fo r those w ith few er resources. Paradoxically, private agencies that serve m ore insured clients m ay also be able to serve m ore lowin com e and uninsured clients. I f rates are at least su fficien t to cover fixed costs, these agencies may also have greater incentives to make sure eligi ble clients are enrolled in Medicaid or Medicare. Although differences in the percentage of subsidized care probably reflect variations in financing mechanisms rather than a different orien tation toward public service, the nonsignificant trend for more sub sidized visits in public facilities suggests that dependence on private revenue to cross-subsidize care may not be a reliable strategy. Depending on cross-subsidies to finance indigent care makes access dependent on agencies' ability to bill for a significant amount of services at rates above cost. Increasing competitive pressure is likely to decrease profit margins, forcing agencies to reduce the amount of subsidized care they give.
Both bivariate comparisons and the multiple variable logit analyses indicate that ownership is related to most, but not all, management strategies. The standardized coefficients in table 3 show that ownership exerts a comparatively stronger influence than other agency or service area characteristics on the following practices: using financial incentives to improve productivity, emphasizing billable services, reducing admin istrative costs, charging fees for missed appointments, and requiring pre payment for some services. On the other hand, agencies located in cities were associated with a lower emphasis on collecting fees and were less likely to charge a fee for missed appointments.
Agencies offering a wide range of services, rather than being less en trepreneurial as we had hypothesized, were actually more likely to use employee financial incentives and separate facilities for insured clients. They were also associated with a nonsignificant tendency (p < .06) to emphasize fee collection and to charge fees for missed appointments. In terestingly, they also provided more subsidized visits than did their counterparts. Possibly, the larger amounts of outpatient care were simply a function o f agency size, but they m ight also reflect a greater reliance on case managem ent. Although agencies were asked to exclude case management from reported outpatient visits, case managers are likely to encourage increased use o f outpatient services as substitutes for hospital ization. Unfortunately, we were not able to control for the presence or the intensity o f case management.
Size, as measured by the number of full-time equivalent outpatient staff, did not affect significantly the use of any management practices we measured. Surprisingly, federally initiated agencies were more likely to have increased their emphasis on billable services during the past year and w ere m ore likely to use a collection agency fo r past du e accounts than w ere agencies n ot started w ith fed era l funds. Th ese agencies also sh ow ed a non sign ifican t (p = .07) tendency to have reduced administra tive costs du rin g the p reced in g year. Th is suggests that rather than serv in g as an in d icator o f pu b lic service orien tation , federa l in itiate status m ay in dicate that an agency is a " m arket survivor" w ith m ore experience or skill than others in m a x im izin g private revenues and in controlling spen din g. Because federa l fu n d in g to C M H C s was lim ite d to roughly seven to ten years, those centers w ere explicitly encouraged to be selfsu pportin g. M ore adaptable agencies are likely to have prospered in the selection process. Supporters o f p riva tiza tio n fre q u en tly claim that private agencies can provide the same service at lo w er cost. In su fficien t data on the costs and qu ality o f o u tp a tien t services p ro v id e d by study participants preven ted us from addressing this issue directly; h ow ever, the fin d in g that private agencies w ere m ore lik e ly than p u b lic agencies to have reduced their ad m inistrative costs in th e past year is evidence that they m ay be m ore likely than p u b lic providers to m in im ize op era tin g costs. Efficien cy in operations should translate in to low er costs, bu t w e have no concrete evi dence that this was the case.
It is im portan t to n ote that the relatively large standard deviations shown in table 1 
Implications for Contracting and Policy
A lth o u g h there are clear differences in the extent to w hich public and private agencies use various practices associated w ith im p roved efficiency and revenue en han cem ent, it is n ot at all clear that these practices affect sign ifican tly an agency's co m m itm en t to serving low -in com e clients or those already in the pu blic system. T h e absence o f perform ance d iffe r ences is an argu m ent fo r contracting w ith private agencies. Because o f th eir greater proficiency in securing revenues, contracting w ith nonprof its could p ro v id e som e re lie f fo r beleaguered pu blic budgets by allowing Sm ith and Lipsky (1992, 1993) argue that contracting is popu lar w ith govern m en t o fficia ls because program changes d o n ot in volve h irin g or firin g pu blic em p loyees, and cuts or increases in hum an service funds can be obscured. A lth o u g h it is u n likely that this is the on ly reason state and local govern m en ts are attracted to private agencies, the perception that private agencies have greater fle x ib ility than pu blic providers in p ro gram m in g and in personn el m an agem en t has prob ab ly contributed to the p riv a tiza tio n o f co m m u n ity m en ta l h ealth services. Sp ecifically, Sm ith and Lipsky b elieve that it is the greater fle x ib ility in n ego tia tin g salaries that has attracted go vern m en t to private agencies. In part b e cause private agencies are less constrained by civil service regulations and labor unions, they o fte n pay low er salaries than p u b lic agencies. Lower personn el costs m ig h t w e ll produ ce sign ifica n t o n e -tim e savings and m ig h t also reduce pension lia b ility , bu t it remains to be seen whether these savings can be sustained over tim e. G iv e n the p o ten tia l disruption in their lives and the lack o f strong evi dence fo r benefits to clients, the decision to shift the locus o f treatment fro m one p rovider to another should n ot be m ade ligh d y.
Summary
T h ere w ere clear differences in our study betw een the m anagem ent strat egies em p lo y ed by pu blic agencies and those favored by private agencies. Th ese differences, how ever, appeared to reflect the realities o f financing rather than any fu n d am en ta l differen ces in their orien tation toward pu blic service. T h ere was no clear evidence that particular management practices affected an agency's perform ance on measures o f financial ac cess or acceptance o f referrals from pu blic hospitals. G overn m en t regula tion and pressure fro m advocacy groups prob ab ly h elp ed to maintain private agencies' focus on these and oth er pu blic goals.
From a pu blic policy perspective, choosing a provider solely on the ba sis o f ow nership status is, at best, a naive approach to p rovid in g public m ental health treatm ent. N o t on ly is there great variation in process and practices w ith in both private and pu blic groups, bu t external factors such as co m p etitio n fro m private practitioners m ay also exert a stronger in flu en ce on agency behavior than does ow nership status. Because most current proposals fo r health care reform rely h eavily on increased co m p e tition a m on g providers to achieve th eir goals, the im portan ce o f ow n er ship status as a pred ictor o f condu ct or perform an ce m ay be fu rther dim inished. T h e em phasis on co m p etitio n could increase differences b e tween urban agencies and those in rural areas w here there is less co m p e tition and, th erefore, requ ire d iffe re n t contracting approaches. A s w e m ove tow ard a health care system based on co m p etitio n , administrators and policy makers w ill be fo rced to abandon th eir reliance on stereotypi cal pu blic/private agency beh avior as guides fo r policy decisions. In 
